What happens if it goes wrong as a SMF: personal enforcement, fines and disqualification under the ODSE regime

Most commentary on the ODSE regime focuses on getting through it: the fitness test, the source of wealth check, the application itself. Almost none of it spells out, in plain terms, what can happen to an individual owner, director or senior executive if the IFR decides they are no longer suitable. This article does exactly that -- the financial-penalty rules where a separate enforcement trigger exists, the removal mechanisms and the disqualification power. The central point is that the Act provides a toolkit rather than a single escalation ladder, and disqualification concerns owner or officer roles at regulated clubs rather than involvement in English football altogether.

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The starting point: this is personal, not just corporate

This article focuses on personal exposure, but not every mechanism is individual-only. Under section 40, for example, the IFR may direct an unsuitable officer, the club, or both; Schedule 9 sanctions may also apply to a club, an individual or another person depending on who committed the relevant failure. What follows is the specific exposure an owner or officer may face after an adverse suitability determination, together with the separate infringements that can lead to personal censure or a financial penalty.

The Act does not require the IFR to choose only one Part 4 remedy. Once a negative suitability finding is made, the available action may include a disqualification order, removal or activity-restriction directions and, for an owner, an ownership removal order. Several measures can therefore operate together. But the routes are not identical for owners and officers, and a financial penalty or public censure under Schedule 9 needs its own statutory trigger -- unsuitability by itself is not enough.

Toolkit Not A Ladder Callout

The Act provides a toolkit, not a single ladder. Measures can overlap, but ownership removal orders apply only to owners and Schedule 9 sanctions require a separate breach.

The financial penalty: the exact mechanism, verified directly against Schedule 9

This is the detail most existing commentary gets wrong by omission or oversimplification, and it matters considerably to anyone carrying out a specified Senior Management Function. The first distinction is critical: a financial penalty is not an automatic consequence of being found unsuitable. The IFR may impose one only where section 75 and Schedule 9 are engaged -- for example, a failure without reasonable excuse to comply with an information requirement, conduct satisfying the section 78 offence threshold, or a relevant infringement defined by Schedule 7. Where that threshold is met, the statutory cap then differs according to whether the person being sanctioned is a club, owner or officer.

Section 4(1)(a) of the Act confirms the starting point directly: every Senior Manager is legally an "officer" of the club for the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, where an SMF holder is personally sanctioned under Schedule 9, the officer-specific formula applies -- unless that individual also qualifies as an owner, in which case the owner formula applies instead.

Schedule 9, paragraph 6(9) -- governing penalties for relevant infringements -- sets the maximum for "an officer of a club (including where P is a senior manager of the club, but not where P is also an owner of the club)". For a fixed penalty, the maximum is the higher of 10% of the officer's remuneration or £75,000. For a daily-rate penalty, the maximum for each day is the higher of 10% of the officer's daily remuneration or £25,000. The same formula appears in paragraph 3(8), where Part 1 is engaged by an information-requirement failure or conduct meeting the section 78 threshold.

The £75,000 and £25,000 figures are not automatic minimum fines. They are the cash alternatives within a higher-of maximum-cap formula, not amounts that the IFR must impose. An officer earning £200,000 a year has a 10% figure of £20,000, so the statutory maximum fixed penalty is £75,000 because that is the higher limb. An officer earning £1 million has a 10% figure of £100,000, so the maximum is £100,000. In every case the IFR retains discretion to set the actual penalty at any amount it considers appropriate up to the applicable cap, applying its sanctions framework and the circumstances of the breach.

One further distinction changes the formula. Where the person being sanctioned is an owner of the club -- including an owner who is also a senior manager or other officer -- paragraph 6(8) applies instead. The fixed-penalty cap is 10% of the club's total revenue and the daily-rate cap is 10% of its daily revenue, with no £75,000 or £25,000 cash alternative. The officer formula in paragraph 6(9) applies only where the person is not also an owner. An employed SMF holder who is not an owner is therefore assessed by reference to their remuneration; an SMF holder who also qualifies as an owner is assessed by reference to club revenue, which may produce materially different exposure.

For current regulated clubs, competition organisers and owners, paragraphs 6(6) and 6(8) use revenue-based caps without the £75,000 or £25,000 cash alternative. Paragraph 6(7) is different: it applies to a body that is no longer a regulated club and uses its own higher-of formula. Under paragraph 6(11), group revenue is used where the relevant club or body is an undertaking within a group.

A penalty may be fixed, calculated by reference to a daily rate, or combine both. Under paragraph 11, a daily amount cannot accrue before the warning notice and ordinarily stops when the conduct giving rise to it ceases. The IFR may also provide for a reduction if payment is made before the date in the decision notice. Where the statutory threshold is met, the IFR may publish a censure statement as well as impose a financial penalty; the statement identifies the person and explains the failure, offence or relevant infringement. For a senior football executive, that public finding may be as consequential as the fine itself.

Two Worked Examples Cash Limb Box

Two worked examples: how the cash limb changes the statutory maximum

Officer earning £200,000 a year: 10% of remuneration is £20,000. Because £75,000 is the higher limb in the cap formula, the maximum fixed penalty available is £75,000. The IFR may impose any appropriate amount up to that cap; £75,000 is not an automatic fine.

Officer earning £1 million a year: 10% of remuneration is £100,000, which exceeds the £75,000 cash limb. The maximum fixed penalty is therefore £100,000. Again, that is a cap rather than the required penalty.

Removal directions: the owner and officer routes are different

Once the IFR determines, or is treated as having determined, that a person is unsuitable for a particular regulated club, sections 39 and 40 provide reasonable-steps removal directions. The two sections are similar in purpose but not identical in structure.

For an owner, section 39 generally requires the IFR to direct the owner personally to take all reasonable steps to cease being an owner before the end of the removal period. It does not contain the section 40 power to direct the club to secure the owner's departure, and section 39(7) contains an exception where the IFR makes an ownership removal order within the statutory three-month window. For an officer, section 40 requires the IFR to give either or both of two directions: one to the individual to take all reasonable steps to cease being an officer, and/or one to the club to take all reasonable steps to secure that outcome. Before either type of removal direction, the IFR must consult the person, the club and the relevant specified competition organiser.

These directions impose a reasonable-steps obligation rather than themselves forcing an immediate transfer or dismissal. Failure without reasonable excuse to comply is a relevant infringement and can engage Schedule 9. For owners, section 43 may also become available. For officers there is no equivalent section 43 removal order: the Act instead provides section 41 activity restrictions, possible section 42 alternative officer arrangements where a section 41 direction affects the club's operation, and section 38 disqualification.

Ownership removal orders: an owner-only power that can be used immediately or after breach

Section 43 gives the IFR a more coercive, owner-only power: an ownership removal order may contain whatever provision the IFR considers appropriate to secure that a person has ceased to be an owner by the end of the period specified in the order. The order may appoint trustees, confer functions on them and require the owner or another person to take action. This goes beyond an obligation merely to take reasonable steps.

Critically, section 43 is not confined to cases where a direction has already been ignored. It is available where the IFR has determined, or is treated as having determined under section 28, that a person is unsuitable to be an owner. Section 39(7) expressly allows the IFR to move directly to an ownership removal order within three months instead of giving the usual section 39 direction. The order is also available after an owner fails without reasonable excuse to comply with a section 39 or section 41 direction, or fails to co-operate with or obstructs an individual appointed under section 42 in the circumstances set out in section 43(2)(d). The owner route can therefore be sequential, but the Act does not mandate a direction-then-order ladder.

Disqualification orders: a restriction that follows the person across regulated clubs

Under section 38, once the IFR determines, or is treated as having determined, that a person is unsuitable to be an owner or officer of a particular regulated club, it may disqualify that person from being an owner or officer, as applicable, of any regulated club. The IFR must first give the person and the club at least 14 days to make representations. The order must state its duration, which may be indefinite, and the IFR may later revoke it.

The scope matters. A section 38 order can prevent a person holding the relevant owner or officer status across the regulated-club population, not only at the club that prompted the finding. But it is not a statutory ban from every form of employment or involvement in English football, and an indefinite order is possible rather than automatic. If the person is also an owner, a separate section 43 order may be used to secure the end of that ownership. Any proposed new owner must also satisfy the Act's prospective-owner approval requirements.

Worked Example Powers Interact Box

Worked example: how the powers can interact in practice

The following is a hypothetical scenario, illustrative only, involving no real club or individual. It shows possible parallel measures, not a mandatory statutory sequence.

A Championship club's Chief Finance Officer, carrying out SMF3, becomes subject to a material change relevant to suitability. The club notifies the IFR under section 33(2), but assume the CFO fails without reasonable excuse to comply with the separate personal notification duty in section 33(1). The IFR later determines that the individual no longer meets the officer fitness criteria.

Officer-removal route

Under section 40, the IFR must direct the individual, the club, or both to take all reasonable steps to secure the end of the officer role within the removal period. It may also use section 41 to restrict specified activities or rights. These measures follow from the unsuitability determination.

Separate sanctions route

The assumed section 33 failure is a relevant infringement under Schedule 7. On that separate legal basis, the IFR may censure the CFO and impose a financial penalty subject to the officer cap. If the CFO then fails without reasonable excuse to comply with a section 40 direction, that is a further relevant infringement. There is no section 43 removal order for a person who is only an officer.

Wider or ownership consequences

The IFR may make a section 38 disqualification order once the officer unsuitability determination exists; it does not have to wait for non-compliance with the removal direction. If the CFO also qualified as an owner and was unsuitable in that capacity, section 43 could separately be used to secure the end of the ownership, either directly after the relevant section 28 determination or after one of the other statutory triggers.

Criminal liability: what section 78 actually criminalises

Section 78 does not create a general offence of simply 'withholding information'. It criminalises specified conduct: intentionally or recklessly destroying or disposing of required information; falsifying or concealing it; causing or permitting its destruction, disposal, falsification or concealment; giving materially false or misleading information to the IFR or an expert reporter while knowing or being reckless as to that fact; knowingly or recklessly giving such information to another person while knowing it will be passed on; and intentionally obstructing an IFR officer exercising powers under a Schedule 8 warrant. On conviction on indictment, the maximum is two years' imprisonment, a fine, or both. On summary conviction, the maximum is imprisonment up to the general limit in a magistrates' court, a fine, or both.

This criminal route is distinct from an adverse suitability finding. A failure without reasonable excuse to comply with an information requirement may instead lead to censure or a financial penalty under Part 1 of Schedule 9, and the IFR may also use that Part where it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person committed a section 78 offence. The Act prevents double punishment for the same act or omission: section 75(5) bars Schedule 9 action after a guilty finding for that conduct, while section 78(7) bars a guilty finding after the IFR has taken Schedule 9 action for it. The practical lesson is precision: non-compliance may be civil, while the particular conduct and mental elements in section 78 can make it criminal. 

What this means in practice for anyone holding an SMF

Three things follow directly from the structure set out above, and they are worth stating plainly.

There is no universal enforcement ladder. The IFR may disqualify once it has the relevant unsuitability determination; an owner may be moved directly into a section 43 order; and an officer has a different route with no officer equivalent of that ownership removal order. Treating every case as direction, then removal order, then disqualification obscures the choices the Act actually gives the IFR.

A financial penalty can be personal, but it needs a separate enforcement trigger. Where an officer who is not also an owner is personally sanctioned under Schedule 9, the statutory cap is calculated by reference to that officer's remuneration using the higher-of formula. The adverse suitability finding itself does not generate the fine.

Information handling is a major dividing line. A failure without reasonable excuse to meet an information requirement may lead to Schedule 9 censure or a financial penalty. Destruction, concealment, materially false or misleading information, or warrant obstruction becomes criminal only where the precise elements of section 78 are met. Prompt, accurate and documented engagement is therefore essential, but it is inaccurate to describe every failure to co-operate as a criminal offence.

For the detail of how an individual's suitability can be revisited after an initial determination, see Lagom's existing guide to section 34 and incumbent owner suitability. For what the IFR's enforcement mechanisms mean at club level, see Lagom's guides to the skilled person power and the expert reporter mechanism.

There is no single escalation ladder. Protecting an individual's position starts with knowing which powers apply to owners, which apply to officers, and which require a separate infringement.

Lagom Sports Compliance is the leading specialist governance, risk, compliance and anti-financial crime consultancy built exclusively for professional football, globally. We supports club CEOs and their leadership teams across both IFR licensing and the ODSE regime, at a level genuinely proportionate to where you actually stand. For licensing, we offer: 

  • Review Only support for clubs preparing their own application who want an independent, criterion-by-criterion review before submission;

  • Part Support for clubs that want to lead certain work-streams while we own others; and

  • Full Support, where a named senior consultant leads the entire licensing project from readiness assessment through to post-submission.

For ODSE specifically, we help CEOs and their leadership teams map exactly who in the organisation is in scope, assess individual readiness against the fitness and source of wealth tests, and build the material change notification process that keeps you compliant for as long as you hold the role, not just at the point of your original determination. If any of the concerns above sound genuinely familiar, get in touch and we will talk through what the right level of support looks like for your specific position.

We have also built a self service IFR readiness assessment tool. It takes around 15 minutes to complete and gives you a guide as to what you may need to, based on what you already have in place.

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This article is brought to you by Lagom Sports Compliance -- the leading governance, risk, compliance and anti-financial crime consultancy built exclusively for professional football. We help clubs, agents and leagues navigate the IFR, UEFA licensing and EU AML obligations with proportionate, practitioner-led support.

Want to talk through what this means for your club?

Frequently asked questions: personal ODSE enforcement

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